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ABSTRACT 
 
In Selten (1967) “Strategy Method,” the second mover in the game submits a complete strategy. 
This basic idea has been exported to nonstrategic experiments, where a participant reports a 
complete list of contingent decisions, one for each situation or state in a given sequence, out of 
which one and only one state, randomly selected, will be implemented.   
In general, the method raises the following concern. If S
0 and S
1 are two different 
sequences of states, and states is in both S
0 and S
1, would the participant make the same decision 
in states  when confronted with S
0 as when confronted with S
1? If not, the experimental results are 
suspect of suffering from an “embedding bias.” 
We check for embedding biases in elicitation methods of Charles Holt and Susan Laury 
(Laury and Holt, 2000, and Holt and Laury, 2002), and of the present authors (Bosch-Domènech 
and Silvestre, 1999, 2002, 2006a, b) by appropriately chosen replications of the original 
experiments. We find no evidence of embedding bias in our work. But in Holt and Laury’s method 
participants tend to switch earlier to the riskier option when later pairs of lotteries are eliminated 
from the sequence, suggesting the presence of some embedding bias.  
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1. Introduction 
Selten (1967) introduced “The Strategy Method” in experimental two-person, sequential games. 
In the strategy method, the second mover submits a complete list of contingent actions out of 
which only one will be implemented in the game. This basic idea has been exported to nonstrategic 
experiments, where a participant (or “subject”) reports a complete list of contingent decisions, one 
for each situation or state s in a determined sequence S, out of which one and only one, randomly 
selected, will be implemented. Because the method generates a relatively large amount of 
individual data at a low cost, it has been widely used in experimental economics.
1 
Note that, in Selten’s (1967) strategy method the second mover makes her (i. e., his or her) 
contingent decisions in a situation of uncertainty, because she does not know which s will occur, 
and the uncertainty is strategic in the sense that it is a player, namely the first mover, who decides 
on s. But in the nonstrategic context the uncertainty is nonstrategic, because it is a random device 
that selects s.  
In general, the method raises the following concern. If S
0 and S
1 are two different 
sequences of states, and states is a term in both S
0 and S
1, would the participant make the same 
decision in states  when confronted with S
0 as when confronted with S
1? An affirmative answer 
means that the decision taken in state s  is does not depend on whether s  is embedded in sequence 
S
0 or in sequence S
1: the decision is then embedding-invariant. But a negative answer would 
question the validity of the data obtained, particularly when the sequence of states is chosen by the 
experimenter for convenience in the absence of a natural grouping of possible states in real life, 
and hence arbitrarily framing the experiment. It that case, we shall refer to an “embedding bias.” 
                                                 
1 The advantage of the strategy method does not lie only on the quantity of data provided but on the type of data. It 
shows the participants’ complete strategies, thus helping the experimenter to better understand their motivations and 
beliefs (see Michael Mitzkevitz and Rosemarie Nagel, 1993).    3
We check for embedding biases in elicitation methods that have been recently used to study 
risk attitudes (attraction or aversion) while paying participants in real money and according to their 
decisions. In particular, we focus on two groups of papers, one by Charles Holt and Susan Laury 
(Laury and Holt, 2000, and Holt and Laury, 2002), and another one by the present authors (Bosch-
Domènech and Silvestre, 1999, 2002, 2006a, b). We replicate the original experiments in these 
groups with appropriately chosen subsequences of the original sequences of states.  In a nutshell, 
we find no evidence of embedding bias in our work.  In Holt and Laury’s method, on the contrary, 
participants tend to switch earlier to the riskier option when later pairs of lotteries are eliminated 
from the sequence, suggesting the presence of some embedding bias.
2  
 
2. Holt and Laury’s method 
2.1. Description  
Participants in Laury and Holt (2000) and Holt and Laury (2002) face a sequence of ten 
pairs of binary lotteries, numbered one to ten in Table 1 below, each pair involving a safer lottery 
(S) and a riskier one (R). The last column in the table indicates the difference “expected dollar 
value of lottery S (denoted EV
S) minus expected dollar value of lottery R (denoted EV
R):” this 
difference decreases and becomes increasingly negative along the ten-pair sequence, and a risk-
neutral individual would choose the pattern SSSS/RRRRRR. Thus, a participant choosing 
SSSSSSS/RRR displays risk aversion. 
3  
This experimental design has been tested for possible order biases by Glenn Harrison et al. 
(2005) and Holt and Laury (2005). We address here a different sort of possible bias, what we call 
embedding bias.  Suppose that a participant selects the pattern SSSSSSS/RRR when facing the 10-
lottery-pair sequence of Table 1: in particular, she chooses the safe option in the lottery pair 
appearing in the seventh row of Table 1. Would she still choose the safe lottery in that pair if, 
instead of facing Table 1, she faced Table 2, obtained from Table 1 by deleting its last three rows? 
Note that, in Table 2, that lottery pair is embedded in a 7-pair sequence, and becomes the last one, 
whereas in Table 1 the very same pair is embedded in a 10-pair sequence, and has three other pairs 
placed after it. A switch from S to R would be a manifestation of embedding bias.  
 
                                                 
2 The tendency to switch earlier in the shorter lists brings to mind the phenomenon, discussed in Steffen Andersen et 
al. (2005), that in multiple-price lists subjects may be inclined to pick a response in the middle of the list, independent 
of true valuations. Incidentally, Andersen et al. believe that the Holt and Laury elicitation method is less likely to 
suffer from this framing effect because “the values are bounded by the laws of probability between 0 and 1,…” From 
this perspective, our work here can be interpreted as the removal of the zero and one anchors.  
3 Laury and Holt (2000) also run similar experiments with losses. But we have not attempted to check for embedding 
biases there, because of the added complexity of replicating this type of experiments (see Bosch-Domènech and 
Silvestre, 2006b).   4
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Table 1. Design of the Holt and Laury experiments (adapted from Glenn Harrison et al., 2005) 
 
Risky Lottery (R)  Formatted: English (U.S.)  6
2.2. Our test for embedding bias in Holt and Laury’s method 
To test for embedding bias we ran an experiment with four sessions, labelled A to D and designed 
five treatments, numbered one to five.   
Treatment 1 was an exact replication of Holt and Laury’s, i. e., each participant faced the 
choice sequence of Table 1.   
In Treatment 2 each participant faced the seven-pair sequence described in Table 2, i. e., 
obtained by deleting the last three rows from Table 1.  
In Treatment 3 each participant faced the seven-pair sequence obtained by deleting rows 1, 
2 and 10 of Table 1.  
In Treatment 4 each participant faced the seven-pair sequence obtained by deleting rows 1, 
to 3 of Table 1.  
Finally, in Treatment 5 each participant faced the seven-pair sequence obtained by deleting 
rows 1, 9 and 10 of Table 1.  
Participants in the experiment were students from the Universitat Pompeu Fabra who 
volunteered. In each session, with a different group of participants, we run four of the five 
treatments in various orders, repeating one of them. Session A, with 28 participants, implemented 
Treatments 2, 3, 4, 1, 2. Session B, with 24 participants, Treatments 4, 5, 2, 1, 4. Session C with 21 
participants, Treatments 1, 2, 3, 4, 1. And Session D, with 24 participants, Treatments 3, 2, 4, 1, 3. 
The results of the four sessions appear in Tables A1 to A4 in the Appendix. Table 3 
displays the ratios of safe choices per lottery-pair number and treatment, i. e., the entry for Lottery 
Pair # j (j = 1,…, 10) and Treatment i (i = 1,…, 5) is the quotient 
 
         Aggregate number of safe choices in Lottery Pair # j and Treatment i  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________        . 
    Aggregate number of choices (safe and risky) in Lottery Pair # j and Treatment i  
 















1 0.99  0.99  -  -  - 
2 0.99  0.98  -  -  1.00 
3 0.99  0.97  0.97 -  1.00 
4 0.98  0.94  0.96  0.96  1.00 
5 0.91  0.78  0.84 0.88  0.83 
6 0.74  0.53  0.58 0.75  0.50 
7 0.35  0.18  0.33 0.32  0.04 
8 0.09  -  0.06  0.09  0.04 
9 0.02  -  0.03  0.03  - 















Table 3. Ratio of safe choices per lottery pair number and treatment (in bold the lottery pairs 
common to all treatments). 
 
The inspection of Table 3 shows that, in Treatments 2 and 5, which are precisely the ones 
where at least two lottery pairs have been deleted at the end of the complete sequence, the 
percentage of safe choices for Lottery Pairs 5, 6 and 7 is remarkably smaller than in the three 
remaining treatments. It appears that, if the sequence ends earlier, then subjects tend to switch 
earlier from the safe to the risky lottery.  
In particular, while for Treatments 1, 3 and 4 about one third (35%, 33% and 32%) of the 
participants display risk aversion in Lottery Pair 7, the percentage plummets to 18% and 4% in 
Treatments 2 and 5. Although less spectacularly, the percentages also appear to differ markedly for 
Lottery Pair 6, where the percentage of safe-choosing participants falls by as much as one third 
when going from Treatments 1, 3 and 4 to Treatments 2 and 5. 
Figure 1 graphically compares the ratios of safe choices in Treatment 1 (our baseline) with 
those in Treatment 2 (the one with the largest number of lottery pairs removed at the end of the 
sequence) for Lottery Pairs 1 to 7. It shows a marked decrease in risk aversion when going from 
Treatment 1 to Treatment 2. 
  As noted by Harrison et al. (2004, p. 1), within-subjects analysis respects “the individual 
heterogeneity that one would expect from risk aversion, which is after all a subjective preference.” 
Our design allows for such analysis. In particular, we can focus on the individual decisions for 
Lottery Pairs 4 to 7 (the only ones common to all five treatments). It can be checked from the data   8
in the Appendix that, when going from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2, the majority (53%) of the 97 
participants shift to a lower number of safe choices, while 13% move to a higher number of safe 
choices, and 34 % maintain the same number of safe choices. 
These comparisons suggest that when deciding on a particular lottery pair, its position in 
the list of pairs in which it is embedded matters. As observed above, it appears as if participants 
feel a pressure to switch to a risky choice before the end of the sequence lottery pairs. If so, this 
pressure is totally justified in the complete sequence of 10 lottery pairs (because anybody who 
likes money must choose lottery R in Lottery Pair 10), but may be due to an embedding bias in the 
sequences where a few of the last terms have been removed.  
   9















Figure 1. The Ratios of Safe Choices in Treatments 1 and 2 for the Lottery Pairs 1 to 7. 
Lottery 
Pair #   10
3. Our method  
3.1. Our elicitation method 
Our experimental elicitation method (Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre 1999, 2002, 2006a, b) also 
aims at analyzing risk attitudes, but differs from the one in the work of Holt and Laury.  
In our experiments, a state is an amount s of potential gain. When facing state s, a participant may 
take one of two actions: either choosing the certain amount of money ps, or playing a lottery that 
gives the amount of money s with probability p (and nothing with probability 1 – p). We ask a 
participant to state her action for each of the possible amounts of money gains s in a given 
sequence S. 
In our previous work, we adopted a treatment where the sequence of possible money 
amounts to be gained is  
S
* = {€3, €6, €12, €30, €45, €60, €90}. 
  A participant was told that she would be randomly assigned, without replacement, to one 
of the seven different money amounts in the treatment, and was asked to choose, for each of the 
different money amounts and before knowing to which of them she would actually be assigned, 
between the certain gain of 0.8 times the money amount and the uncertain prospect that gives the 
money amount with probability 0.8 and nothing with probability 0.2. We say that a participant 
displays risk attraction (resp. risk aversion) in a particular choice if she chooses the uncertain 
(resp. certain) alternative. 
  The participants, student volunteers from Universitat Pompeu Fabra, were given a folder 
to record their decisions, which contained one page for each money amount in the treatment. 
Every page had five boxes arranged vertically. The certain gain was printed in the first box, and 
the amount of money of the uncertain prospect in the second one, with the statement that the 
probability of winning was 0.8. The third box contained two check cells, one for choosing the 
certain gain, and another one for choosing the uncertain prospect.
4 Below a separating horizontal 
line, two more boxes were later used to record the random outcome and the take-home amount. In 
order to facilitate decisions, a matrix on the back of the page showed all the amounts of money 
involved. The participants received this information as written instructions (available on request), 
which were read aloud by the experimenter. The treatment began after all questions were 
privately answered. Once all participants had registered their decisions (under no time constraint: 
nobody used more than 15 minutes), their pages were collected. Participants were then called one 
by one to an office with an urn that initially contained a number of pieces of paper: each piece 
                                                 
4 Note that there is no default, i.e., “doing nothing” is not an option.    11
indicated one money amount, and each of the different amounts occurred the same number of 
times. A piece of paper was randomly drawn (without replacement): the experimenter and the 
participant then checked her choice for that particular money amount. If her choice was the 
certain gain, she would take home 0.8 times the amount of money of her class. If, on the contrary, 
she chose the uncertain prospect, then a number from one to five was randomly drawn from 
another urn. If the number one was drawn, then the participant would take nothing home. 
Otherwise, she would take home the total amount of money. The participant was then paid and 
dismissed, and the next participant was escorted into the office. 
  
3.2. Our test for embedding bias in our elicitation method 
To test for embedding bias in our elicitation method just described, we conducted an experiment 
where, in addition to Treatment S*, we implemented three new treatments, each characterized by 
one of the following sequences of amounts to be gained: 
S
1 = {€3, €6, €12, €30, €45, €60}, 
S
2 = {€3, €6, €12, €30, €45}, and  
S
3 = {€3, €6, €12, €30}. 
  The notation indicates that sequence S
t is obtained by deleting the last t terms of sequence 
S* (t = 1, 2, 3). Notice that treatments S
1, S
2, S
3 and S* share the first four amounts of money. 
  A participant in the experiment faced a single sequence,
 i.e., participated only in one 
treatment. We had 28 participants in Treatment S
1, 27 in Treatment S
2, 24 in Treatment S
3 , and a 
total of 108 corresponding to four sessions of Treatment S*.
5   
  The experimental results are presented in Tables A5-A8 in the Appendix. For each 
treatment we compute the frequency of choices favoring the certain gain for each amount of 
money at risk, see Table 4.  
                                                 
5 In addition to a new session of Treatment S*, we use also data from previous experiments reported in Bosch-
Domènech and Silvestre (1999, 2002, 2006a).   12
In the experiments that we had previously performed involving the seven amounts of 
money of Treatment S*, we had systematically verified that the frequency of risk aversion 
increases with the amount of money at stake along the sequence of money amounts. We have 
interpreted this pattern as being determined by the absolute amounts of money involved. But, in 
principle, it could also be driven by the confounding effect of how close an amount of money is 
to the end of the sequence presented to the participants, manifesting an embedding bias. If this 
were the case, we would expect that, for a given amount of money at stake, risk aversion would 
be more frequent when that amount appears at or near the end of the sequence. In terms of Table 
4, the frequency of risk aversion for the higher amounts of money would then decrease as we 
move down the corresponding columns.  
The inspection of Table 4 does not indicate this to be the case. The numbers are 
reasonable close across treatments, with a few exceptions (marked in boldface) which do not 
seem to have much bearing with the issue that concerns us here.  In the case of the highest 
amount (€30) covered by all four treatments, the frequencies of risk aversion are 
indistinguishable and, therefore, independent on where “€30” is located in the sequence of 
amounts to be gained. The same is true of the highest amount of money covered by more than 
one treatment (€60), and for two of the three frequencies in the intermediate case of €45. In any 





  €3  €6   €12   €30   €45   €60   €90  
Treatment S
1  0.39  0.50  0.65  0.82     
Treatment S
2 0.52  0.52  0.78  0.85 0.81     
Treatment S
3 0.50  0.50  0.79  0.83 0.79  0.875   
Treatment S*    0.45    0.59  0.75  0.85 0.88 0.91      0.93 
 
Table 4.  Frequency of choices favoring the certain gain (and thus displaying risk aversion). 
  
4. Relation to the literature 
The two elicitation methods tested in this paper share the following three features.  
(a) Participants face lists of states, and report decisions contingent to every state. 
                                                 
6 A cursory inspection of the data on risk attitude when confronting losses found in Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre 
(2006b), obtained by the same elicitation procedure, does not show evidence of embedding bias in that case either, but 
the sample size for each treatment is substantially smaller than here, hindering inference.    13
(b) The state is randomly selected, instead of being strategically chosen by a player, as in 
Selten’s (1967) strategy method.  
(c) The participant makes her decisions before knowing which state occurs. We say that 
the decisions (or the corresponding treatment) are “cold” if this is the case, and “hot” otherwise.  
Note that the treatment is likely to be cold if participants face lists of states, but features 
(a) and (c) are logically independent.
7 
As we will see next, the literature offers different combinations of features (a)-(c), testing 
for forms of contamination similar to what we call embedding bias, but sometimes mixing 
embedding with temperature (hot or cold). Psychological effects of the vividness, immediacy and 
salience of an actual situation may generate differences between hot and cold treatments.
8 
Perhaps the anticipated response (a cold response) of a person to a situation that may or may not 
occur differs from the actual response (hot) when the situation actually occurs, and one may 
conjecture that temperature potentially creates a source of bias beyond any embedding effect. 
Yet our previous work shows no temperature effect for our design: In Bosch-Domènech 
and Silvestre (1999, 2006a) we asked the participants whether they wanted to reconsider their 
choice after being randomly assigned to a money amount: in fact, the same participant faced an 
embedded, cold decision first, and a single, hot decision later. Out of a combined total of 63 
participants, only two did change their mind, which indicates that temperature, in general, played 
no significant role. 
As in the procedure followed in the two groups of experiments that we have tested, the 
selection of the state is nonstrategic in Starmer and Sugden (1991). The experiment was designed 
to test the reduction principle in compound lotteries and the common consequence effect, rather 
than embedding or temperature biases. But some of the information that they obtained is germane 
to, if not strictly to embedding, certainly to temperature. They refer to a weak “contamination 
effect,” defined as a tendency for the “random-lottery” responses to differ slightly from “real-
choice” responses. They do not statistically test for a contamination effect, but they conclude the 
paper with the following words. 
“All we can say is that for the choice problems used in our experiment, subjects’ 
responses did not differ much between the random-lottery and the real-choice 
designs. If there are any ‘contamination effects’ at work in the experiment, they 
seem to be fairly weak.” (Starmer and Sugden, 1991, page 978.) 
                                                 
7 The following two examples illustrate the independence. Participants in Groups A and D of the experiment reported 
in Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (1991) faced a list of two states, yet they knew which of the states occurred: 
thus the treatment was hot. Conversely, a Second Mover in Treatment 1H of Andrew Schotter et al. (1994) had to 
decide for only one possible state (i.e., when First Mover had chosen R), but her decision was cold because there was 
no guarantee that the state would occur.   
8 See, e.g., Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross (1980).   14
 
John Hey and Jinkwon Lee (2005) set up an experiment with two parts, “Pairwise 
Choice” and “Complete Ranking.” In the Pairwise Choice, subjects are faced with a list of 30 
binary choices, and they are paid according to their choice in a randomly selected pair. Hence, the 
design is similar to Holt and Laury’s and to ours. The Complete Ranking part asks for the ranking 
of eleven gambles in order of preference. The design is intended to test whether subjects respond 
to the list as a whole or question by question. They find that the hypothesis that subjects answer 
question by question is strongly supported against the alternative, a result which is in line with 
our findings here concerning our elicitation method. 
Much of the relevant literature for the case where the state is chosen by a player compares 
the strategy method with the ordinary-play method (that only uses date gathered at junctures of 
the actual play of the game), and, thus, tests for combined embedding-temperature effects. In 
Jordi Brandts and Gary Charness (2000), the hot treatment corresponds to the ordinary-play 
method, while their cold treatment follows the strategy method. In their words (page 228): “One 
might expect that some actions would trigger stronger emotional responses in this hot 
environment, where only effective actions are recorded.”  Nevertheless, they conclude that there 
is little difference between the responses obtained by the strategy method versus the ordinary-
play method. Other papers point in the opposite direction. Jeannette Brosig et al. (2003) find 
differences between the two methods for “punishment” games.
9  
Werner Güth et al. (2001) consider three versions of a “mini ultimatum game.” They find 
that some differences among the three versions which appear in the ordinary-play method 
disappear when the strategy method is follows, although the differences are not significant at a 
5% significance level (Brandts and Charness, 2000, page 233). The “mini” in the mini-
ultimamum game refers to the fact that the proposer can make only two proposals, whereas in a 
conventional ultimatum game proposers can propose any division, perhaps subject to step 
constraints. Robert Oxoby and Kendra McLeish (2004) conduct ultimatum game experiments 
(dividing $10 at $1 steps) under both the strategy and the ordinary-play methods, and report 
similar results in them.
10 Timothy Cason and Vai-Lam Mui (1998) report on experiments for the 
Dictator Game, where the first mover decides how to divide $40 constrained to $2 steps (a total 
of 21 possible divisions, (40, 0), (38, 2) and so on), whereas the second mover, contrary to the 
                                                 
9 But they presented the information in a matrix rather than a tree, and we know from Schotter et al. (1996) that this 
may not be innocuous.   
10 As in Brandts and Charness (2000), in the strategy method participants have to report their strategies for both the 
contingency where they play first mover and for that where they play second mover, but they actually play either 
first or second mover, the alternative being selected at random. Hence, the selection of the state has both strategic 
and random components.   15
ultimatum game, has no choice. In order to study social influence, they designed an experiment 
where a first mover plays twice (with two different second movers, who never are first movers), 
and her second proposal can be made contingent to the first proposal of another first mover to 
whom she has been randomly paired. In the hot treatment, a first mover makes her second 
proposal after knowing the first proposal of the first mover to which she has been paired, whereas 
in the cold treatment she has to submit a list of 21 second proposals contingent to each of the 21 
possible states, each state being defined by a first proposal of the other first mover. Note that 
there is no real strategic interaction between a first mover and the other first mover to which she 
has been randomly paired, because a first mover’s payoff does not depend on another first mover, 
but the (payoff irrelevant) state is decided by another player. Cason and Mui (1998) find no 
significant different between the two methods.   
 
4. Conclusions 
The possibility of biases due to embedding or temperature cannot be ignored. While some 
elicitation designs in the literature appear to be free from these biases, others are not. Here we have 
checked for embedding biases in the elicitation methods of Holt and Laury and our own by 
replicating the original experiments while varying the lists where the various decisions are 
embedded.  
We find no evidence of embedding bias in our work. But we discover a degree of 
embedding bias in Holt and Laury elicitation method: participants tend to switch earlier to the 
riskier option when later pairs of lotteries are eliminated from the sequence, indicating that their 
original work may overestimate the extent of risk aversion. Yet the bias is purely quantitative, 















Treatment 2   Treatment 3  Treatment 4   Treatment 1         Treatment 2 
SSSSSS/R SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSSSS SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS 
SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSSS SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/R SSSSSSSSS/R  SSS/RR/SS 
SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSSS SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSS/RR SSS/RRRR  SS/RRRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR  SSSS/RRR 
SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSSS SSSSS/RR  SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRRRRR  S/RRRRRR 
SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSS/R SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSSS/RR SSSSSSS 
SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  S/R/SS/RRR  SSSSSSSS/RR SSSSS/RR 
SSSS/RRR SS/RRRRR  S/RRRRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR 
SSSS/RRR SS/RRRRR  S/RRRRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR SSSSS/RR 
SSSSS/R/S S/RR/SS/RR  SSS/RRR/S  SSSSSS/R/S/RR  S/RR/SSSS 
SSSSSS/R SSSSSS/R  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSS/R SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSSS/RR SSSSSSS 
SSSS/RRR SS/RRRRR  SSS/RRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR 
SSSSSS/R SSS/RRRR  SSS/RRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR  SSSSSS/R 
SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSSSSS 
SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SS/RRRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSS/RR SSS/RRRR  SS/RRRRR  SSSS/RRRRRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSS/RRR SS/RRRRR  S/RRRRRR  SSSS/RRRRRR  SSSSSSS 
SSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR  S/RRRRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR SSSSSSS 
SSSSS/RR SSSSS/RR  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R 
 
 
Table A1. Choices of participants in Session A on Holt and Laury’s elicitation method.    17
 
 
Treatment 4  Treatment 5     Treatment 2  Treatment 1    Treatment 4 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRRRRR SS/RRRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR 
SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SSS/RRRR  SSSS/RRRRRR S/RRRRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR 
S/RRRRRR SSS/RRRR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  S/RRRRRR 
SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSS/RRRRR SS/RRRRR 
SS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSS/RRRR SSS/RRRR 
SS/R/S/RRR SSSS/RRR  SS/R/S/RRR  SSSSS/RRRRR  SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRR/S SSS/RRR/S  SSS/RRR/S  SSSSSSSSSS  RRR/SSSS 
SSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR 
SSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSSS  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR 
S/RRRRRR SSS/RR/S/R  SS/R/S/RRR  SSS/RRR/S/RRR  SSS/RRRR 
SSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR 
SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/R  SSSSS/RRRRR SS/RRRRR 
SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SS/RRRRR 
 
 
Table A2. Choices of participants in Session B on Holt and Laury’s elicitation method.  
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 Treatment 1     Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 4      Treatment 1 
SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R  SSSSS/RR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSSS  SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSSS  SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R  SSS/RRRR SS/RRRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R  SSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR  SSSSSSSS/RR 
SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R  SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSS/RRRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSS/RRRRR 
SSSSSSSS/RR SSSSSS/R SSSSS/RR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R  SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSSSS/R  SSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
SSSSS/RRRRR SSSSS/RR  SSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
SS/R/SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SSS/RRRR  SSSS/RRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR SS/RRRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR 
SSSSSSS/RRR SSSSSS/R SSSS/RRR SSS/RRRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
SSSS/RRRRRR SSSSSSS  SSSS/RRR SSSS/RRR  SSSSSSS/RRR 
 
 
Table A3. Choices of participants in Session C on Holt and Laury’s elicitation method.  
 
 






 Treatment 3  Treatment 2     Treatment 4   Treatment 1      Treatment 3 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RRRRR  SSS/RRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRRRRR  SS/RRRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSS/RRRR SSSSSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSSSS  SSSS/RRR SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR  RRRRRRR SSS/R/S/RRRRR  SS/RRRRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSSS/RR  SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRRRRR  SSS/RRRR 
SSSS/RRR SSSSS/RR  SSS/RRRR SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSS/RRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  S/RRRRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR 
SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR  SS/RRRRR SSSSS/RRRRR  SSS/RRRR 
SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SS/RRRRR SSSSS/RRRRR SS/RRRRR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSSS/R  SSSS/RRR SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSSS/R  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSS/RRR 
SSSSS/RR RR/S/R/SSS RR/S/R/SSS  RR/S/R/SSSS/RR  RR/S/R/SSS 
SS/R/S/RRR SSSSSSS  SSSSS/RR  SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSSS/R  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSSSS  SSSS/RRR SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR  RRRRRRR SSSSS/RRRRR SSS/RRRR 
SSSSS/RR SSSSSS/R  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSS/RRRR  SSSS/RRR 
SSSS/R/S/R SSSSS/RR  SSS/RRRR  SSSSSSSS/RR  SSSSS/RR 
RRRRRRR SSSSSS/R  SSS/RRRR SSSSSS/RRRR SSSS/RRR 
RRRRRRR SSSS/RRR  RRRRRRR SSSS/RRRRRR  SS/RRRRR 
SSSSS/RR SSSS/RRR  SSSS/RRR SSSSSSS/RRR  SSSSS/RR 
SS/RRRRR SSSS/RRR  SSS/RRRR SSSS/RRRRRR  SSS/RRRR 
SSSSSSS SSSSSSS  SSSSSS/R  SSSSSSSSS/R  SSSSSSS 
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Table A5. Treatment S
1. A letter c indicates choosing the certain gain (thus displaying risk 
aversion), while a letter u indicates choosing the uncertain gain (thus displaying risk attraction). 
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Table A6. Treatment S
2. A letter c indicates choosing the certain gain (thus displaying risk 
aversion), while a letter u indicates choosing the uncertain gain (thus displaying risk attraction). 
Each line corresponds to the decisions of one participant.   22
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Table A7. Treatment S
3. A letter c indicates choosing the certain gain (thus displaying risk 
aversion), while a letter u indicates choosing the uncertain gain (thus displaying risk attraction). 
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Table A8. Treatment S*. A letter c indicates choosing the certain gain (thus displaying 
risk aversion), while a letter u indicates choosing the uncertain gain (thus displaying 
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